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Abstract
The core of a market in indivisible goods can be defined In terras
of strong domination or weak domination.
The core defined by strong domination is always non-empty, but
may contain points which are unstable in a dynamic sense. However, it is
shown that there are always stable points in the core, and a characterization
is obtained.
The core defined by weak domination is always non-empr.y when
there is no indifference, and has no instability problems. In this case,
the core coincides with the unique competitive allocation.

In a recent paper, Shapley and Scarf [19 74] consider a market
with indivisible goods as a game without side payments. They define the
core of this irarket in the usual way, is the set of allocations which are
not strongly dominated, and prove that it. Is always non-empty. However,
they show by an example that this result depends on the core being defined
in terms of strong rather than weak domination; if the core is defined by
weak domination, then there are markets for which the core is empty. The
purpose of this paper is to point out several other implications of the
differences between strong and weak domination in this type of market game.
The first consequence of using strong instead of weak domination
is that it is possible for a point in the core of a market to be unstable
he following sense: an allocation x can be in the core of a given market,
but not be in the core of the market in which x itself is the initial endow-
ment. In a sense, x would be stable, only until it was realized. There will
always exist stable allocations in the core, however, and we will characterize
the set of stable allocations in terms of prices.
Also, the relation between the core and the set of competitive
allocations depends on whether strong tv weak domination is used to define
the core. When the core is defined by strong domination, it always contains
the set of competitive allocations (which is itself non-empty, and can contain
several allocations). The core can be strictly larger than the set of comp^
tii_ive allocations.
When the core is defined by weak domination, it can be empty. In
particular the core need not contain the non-empty set of competitive allocations
However, it can be shown that if no trader is indifferent between any of the
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We consider markets with n traders, each of whom owns one
visible good. (Shapley and Scarf suggest a market in bouses <P~
riate example1). The traders each have pure! Lnal preferences over the
goods, and no trader ha any use for more than one item.
We denote the Initial endowment of the market by w =
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allocatio r x .........
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corresponding w..
Let N denote, the set of all t -;, and let £ of
N. We say that an allc location y
is some coalition S such that
(i) {xJieS} = {w.jicS}, and
x' 1
(ii) x.P.y, for all icS.
x i y i
The first condition says that the coalition S is • tive for the
allocation x. and the second condition s ys that mber of S strictly
prefers x to y. Thus x (strongly) dominates y if, by trad ....
i coalition S could arrive at a reallocation x which is referr
by each member of S.
We define weak doininatior
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allocation x = (
M(w) , since it assigns to e fact, x is a
corr.petitive allocation in M(w) ;rted by pi: •1,1,1.
Let us now look at y = (wn) ; ), which gives only trader 2 his :.
preferred good. It is straightforward to show that y cannot be competitive,
but y is in the core of M(w) , since it is undorainated by any other aJ :ion.
In particular, the allocation x fails to dominate ._ause the coalition of
traders {1,3/ which strictly prefers x to y is nor ctive for x (i.e. t
cannot accomplish x r..ithout trader 2), while the traders in the grand coalition
{1,2,3} do not all strictly ce trader 2 w, in
alii
Nev is the cation y cannot be consi<
suppose that the mar uit in . ' i.e. suppose
that the only trade should be the bilateral traders 1 and 2. As
soon as the traders take possession t >ds, a new market comes
into being: the market . And in this m*
, y is ated by x,
ice the coalition {1,3}, v strict :fec.tive t
Simply stated, once the endowment of the marker = (w9 ,w ,w„) ,
the co on {1,3} is effective for the mutual ble bilateral trade
which results in the allocation x.
The difficulty in the previous example ai from the fact th
the allocation y is not In the core of the market
an allocation x to be stable if and only if it is in the core of M(x)
.
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Theorem 1; There exists at least or
in the core of every market I
Pry
o
f ; Let y be an . M(w)
.
y is also in the core of M(y ) then we rwise there is
an allocation y which dominates y in the market M(y ) . Since every
trader can always choose to retain his endowment, we may assume that for
10 I
each itN, y.R.y ; that is, every trader likes his assignment at y at10
least as much as his assignment at y . But since y dominates y in the
market M(y ), there is some non-empty coalition which strictly prefers
y to y . This monotonicity , together with the finiteness of the market
(and the transitivity of preferences), assures the finite convergence
of the process: if y " is not in the core of M(y ), then we find another
2
allocation y which dominates it, and in a finite number of steps we find
a y which is in the core of M(y) . To see that y is also in the core of
M(w) , note that if there were an allocation z \ dominated y in t
market M(w) , then z would also dominate y , since y^R.y. for every trader
ieN.
To see the relation between s Lty and prices, we define a
price vector TT to be any non-zero vector of non-negative numbers rr =
(ik,...,tt ), and we say that a pair (tt,x) where ?r is a price vector and
x is an allocation is an efficiency equilibrium if, for every trader ieN,
x.P raplies tt
.
> tt Intuitively, if (7r,x) is an efficiency equilibrium,
then the allocation x gives to each trader i the best good he cculd purchase
at the prices TT, were he to sell his own assignment x. at Lhe price tt . .
i
We say that an allocation x is ef f icieut if there exists a price vector tt
2/
such that (tt,x) is an efficiency equilibrium.-
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Theorem 2: An allocation is . If it is efficient.
Proof: Let x be ar lere exists a
price vector tt such chat for all i£N, x P.x, Suppose now
that x were not stabl . in x i. i n the cor« , so there Is an
allocation y which dominal in S C N in the ma >l(x)
.
This means {y. ieS} = {x. ieS} and >r ail i each u'ader1
' i ' i i 1
ieS strictly prefers some good y. = x. , which implies tt > tt , . But E
the good x. must belong to some play 5, we can construct a 'cycle'
tt. > tt ,>...> tt. > tt., where i,j,k are all members of S. This is plainly
j i k J » »j
»
an absurdity, so we see that x must be stable if it is efficient.
; let x be a stab.le outcome. Then no coalitio; traders exis
which, by trading amc Hers, could alio
prefei
there must be some I
oth • »ods in t ofi tab
among a coalition of pi
1 p
likes the good b to i ... al d in the market)
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any o. remaining t
i
traders » therr- d at least
Ln the
necessary so that th 2,
In this manner we can order all of the trade .it k likes his
4/good at least as well as that >r numbered trader.— let tt

price it in •
1
50 WO'
in the core is a phenomenon Lvisibility
of goods in the n~
tinuous and insatiable preferences),
in the core is stable.
To see this, consider an unstable allocation x. The fact
that x Is not in the core of M(x) means that there is some allocation y
which dominates x in the market M(x) . As noted in the proof of Theorem 1,
we may assume without loss of generality that each trader (weakly) pref
co x. . However, In a market with a divisible commodit -^s
th ;ier allocation, y , such that evei
prefers x. The allocation y is luced from y by mean
aal transfer of the divisible good from traders who strict 1
preferred y to x to iraders who were Lndiff< y and
Since every ti '"ictly pref ition y to x,
x is not in he core of any ace the coalition o aders
is effective regardi t). So every allocati
in the core of a :
Note also that v unsi allocation can be weakly
dominated (via the coalition of all traders), no allocation in the
defined by weak domination is unstable.
We will now examine the relationship of the core and ti. of
competitive allocations. We have:
Proposition : Any competitive allocation is in the core defined
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by strong domination.
Pro . We first show
thought of as f top
be the set of traders wh Lced a
other good, then Ln S. must
Furthermore, they must only since i
trader purchases the good of T,n there must be
outside of S a trader k who receives the initial endowment of some trader
in S
1
, which costs more than w, . But this is clearly impossible at a com-
petitive allocation. If S CN - {S.,} is the. set of traders whose goods a
priced as h any other excepting those owned by m
see that traders Ln S 9 must be receiving their most desire
those of S ). this maimer v LI have J...UF
trading cycle for N, S a top trading cycJe - (S 1 ) and so on.
Shapley arf have sh< lat any allocation with this erty
the co ed by stron; i nation.
imma 1 : r is Lnd i
a comp kly domi t n.
-
i x as
S ,S„, . .
.
,S . Let y be
± z p i 1
the coaj nee S.. ii h meml
most preferred good. If domina
1
S,US , sine Ls effeel .12 12 2 I a
.ain s i x an
; most preferred i Et) . Pn this
x weakly dominates all other alio
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Theorem 3 : If no trader is indifferent between any gords, then
the core defined by weak domination is always non-empty, and contains exactly
one allocation. This allocation is the unique competitive allocation.
Proof ; We know that under the conditions abcve a competitive
allocation weakly dominates every other allocation, (competitive cr rut).
Thus we need only show that no allocation weakly dominates a competitive
allocation.
Let x be a competitive allocation. Associated with x are
coalitions S.,...,S (top trading cycles) which are effective for x, and
1 p
prices if- f ... f irM which are constant for each S and such that i < j Implies
\ 2 V
Suppose y weakly dominates x via some coalition T. Then
{y.|ieT} {w.|ieT}, y^x for all ieT, and y±*±x± f°r at least one ^ c
Let j be the smallest integer such that S/}T t <f>. Since x is
j
competitive, if y±^±\t for i£S f}T, then y must have scld at a higher
price than x . But this implies that y must have been traded in some S.
for k < J, and hence must have been the initial endowment of some member w
of S,
. But T is effective for y, so m£T. This contradicts our assumption
that j was the smallest integer such that S/jT t <fr.
Thus it is false that y.P.x. for ieS.AT. and since there is ac
i i i j
indifference, and jA** for all ieT, it must be that y. - :•'.. for all leSi|T.
If we assume the S.,...,S are minimal cycles, then it follows
that S.CT, and T - S. is effective for y.
Continuing in the same manner, we see that for all lei, x.. y ,
contradicting the assertion that y dominates x.
i • •
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If we had merely wanted to show that there was a unique c
petitive allocation, we would have done so by using the fact that every
competitive equilibrium can be generated using top trading cycles.
These results partially clarify a question Shapley and Scarf
raise: Can there be non-competiti ve points in the core defined by strong
domination which are not weakly dominated by a competitive allocation?
If there is no indifference, Lemma 1 says that a competitive allocation
weakly dominates everything else. Thus if there exists a market of this
type with allocations in the core defined by strong domination which are
not weakly dominated by a competitive allocation, there must be indifference
in some peoples preferences.
The effect of not ruling out indifferences in traders' preferences
can be shown by the following examples:
Example 1 : A market in which allocations x and y are completely
indifferent for all traders and x is competitive but y is not.
Let there be four traders with the following preferences over t
four goods.
P
l
: W
2
I
l
W
4
P
l
W
l
P
l
w
3
P
2
: ^P
2
w
3
P
2
w
2
P
2
w
/4
P~: w. P„w. I_w„P„w..,
.5 1 3 4 2 z 3 J
P4: w
1
P
4
w
3
P
4
w
/<
P,w
2
Then it is easy to verify that x = (w.,,w
,
,w, ,w„) is competitive
where TT. =» t' > lf« - ", and that all traders are indifferent between x and
y = (w, ,w..,w
2
,w~) . But y cannot be competitive since v = it = 7T„ = it
in any price system that makes y possible. But trader 4 would not chooi
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w~ but rather w
1
is this situation. Note that there is another competitive
allocation z = (w
/
,w^,w 9
,w ) supported by prices tt = it > tt~ = n. which
weakly dominates both x and y via the coalition {1,4}. Perhaps even stranger
is the second example,
Example 2 : A market in which x is competitive, y is not compe-
titive and y is weakly Pareto superior to x.
Let there again be four traders with the following preferences,
which are the same as the previous example except for trader 3.
V W2WlWlPlW3
V W1 P 2W3P2W2 P2W4
P : w. I w,,P,1w.P„w /-3 13 2 3 4 3 3
P, : w, P.w^P.w, P/W...
4 1434442
Again x = (w,. ,w, ,w, ,w.,) is competitive at prices tt., - it > n - it
and y * (w, ,w. »w2 ,w~) cannot be competitive. But now we see that trade
1, 2, and 4 are indifferent between x and y, but that, trader 3 pref ers
y to x.
Again, however, z = (w. ,w„,w ,w
1
) is competitive at prices
TT = tt, > if = TT- and z weakly dominates both x and y via {1,4
That a competitive allocation Indivisible commodities m
not be Pareto optimal is not new; Emmerson [1972] has shown an example of
this phenomenon. But in Emmerson's example the Pareto optimal allocation
which dominates the competitive allocation is itself competitive, where
it is not in our example.

FOOTNOTES
The assumption that no trader prefers owning several items
to owning the most preferred is solely for convenience of notat:
Since each trader begins with one item, if each prefers something
to nothing, individual rationality imp!. ach trader ends up with
one item. Thus the relation of severe-. .ns to single items is
superfluous.
2
This terminology is borrowed, from Shitovitz [19 73 j .
3
This construction is the. method of "top trading cycles 1
due to D. Gale, discussed in Shapley and Scarf [1974].
4
This ordering constitutes a 'top trading cycle' in which
each cycle consists of exactly one player. See previous footnote.
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